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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

RULE 803(3): THEN EXISTING MENTAL,
EMOTIONAL, OR PHYSICAL CONDITION.
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule. even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind. emotion.
sensation, or physical condition (such as intent. plan. motive.
design. mental feeling. pain, and bodily health. but not
including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to execution.
revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. I
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) provides a hearsay exception
for a declarant's statements of his presently existing physical
conditions, as well as for his present mental or emotional
condition. Further, statements showing the declarant's presently
existing state of mind may constitute evidence of a declaration of
plan, reason, motive, design and intent of subsequent conduct.
Federal Rule 803(3) requires that a declaration concerning
either a physical condition or a mental or emotional state must be
directed at a present condition. 2 The hearsay rule does not apply
to statements of a past event or condition, since such statements
are formulated after a period of reflection. 3 The rationale behind
this hearsay exception is that statements concerning the
declarant's then existing physical or mental condition may be
more trustworthy and reliable than statements and explanations of

1. FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
2. 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER. \WEISTEI\*S
EvIDENCE 803(3)[01], at 114 (Joseph M. Mclaughlin ed., 1995).
8033)1011. at 116
3. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2.
("[Dlescriptions of past pain or symptoms, and explanations of how an injury
occurred, are not admissible pursuant to Rule 803(3)"). But see Mean\ \.
United States, 112 F.2d 538, 540 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that patient's
description of past medical condition was admissible, since the -patient hald]
an equal motive to speak the truth; what he ha[ld felt in the past lwasl as apt to
be important in his treatment as what he [felt] at the moment-).
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past conditions. 4 These declarations are likely to be trustworthy
because the current testimony of a witness as to his prior physical
or mental condition may suffer from an impairment in memory or
present a risk of fabrication. 5 Therefore, under Federal Rule
803(3), these contemporaneous hearsay statements "are
considered of greater probative value than the present testimony
6
of the declarant."
One aspect of Federal Rule 803(3) allows for the admittance of
currently existing physical conditions. 7 A person describing his
or her present physical condition significantly aids a doctor in
understanding the extent of injuries, particularly when they are
internal. 8 Similarly to Federal Rule 803(4), Rule 803(3).allows
into evidence statements of a person's present pain and suffering,
even if they were not made to a physician. 9 However, only
declarations of present, not past, pain and suffering are
admissible, since "contemporaneity is the guarantee of
trustworthiness, statements indicative of reflection rather than
spontaneity are excluded." 10 The underlying rationale for
admitting statements showing the declarant's present state of
mind, namely that statements of then existing mental condition
are more reliable than statements describing a past mental state,
is similar to admitting statements of present pain and suffering. 11

4. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2,
5. See id.

803(3)[011, at 114.

6. MCCORMICK ON EVl1iENCE, § 273, at 480 (John William Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992).
7. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3); FED R. EVID. 803(4).
8. See Northern Pac. R.R. v. Urlin, 158 U.S. 271, 274 (1895) ("Every
one knows that when injuries are internal and not obvious to visual inspection,
the surgeon has to largely depend on the responses and exclamations of the
patient when subjected to examination.").
9. See Mabry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.2d 497, 498 (5th Cir. 1952)
(holding that declarations of present pain and suffering made to husband
admissible).
10. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, 803(3)[01], at 116.
11. See id.
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In United States v. Cardascia,1 2 the Second Circuit stated that
the 803(3) exception -[was] a specialized application of the
present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions13
The court stated that the reasons behind the 803(3) exception to
the hearsay rule "focus[ed] on the contemporaneity of the
statement and the unlikelihood of deliberate or conscious
misrepresentation." 14 The court noted that when a statement falls
within the exception, the court must determine whether the
statement relates, on the one hand, to a then existing state of
mind or, on the other, a statement of memory offered to establish
15
a fact believed to be true.
Statements of present intent may be relevant evidence to show
that the declarant acted in accordance with his intent. The
seminal case illustrating this aspect of the rule was Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Hilhfnon. 16 In Hillnon, the plaintiff, Sallie
Hillmon, sued several insurance companies to recover on her
husband's death benefit insurance policies. 17 The insurance
companies refused to pay the policies, alleging that plaintiff and
her husband conspired to defraud the insurance companies by
falsifying John Hilmon's death. 18 Sallie Hillmon claimed that the
body which was found in a creek was that of her husband. John
Hillmon. The insurance companies, however, alleged that the
body which was found was that of John Hillmon's traveling
partner. Frederick Walters. 19 The insurance companies
introduced letters, written by Walters to his sister and fiancee.
which indicated his intention to go with Hillmon on a trip. 20 The

12. 951 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1991) In this case, the defendants appealed
convictions on grounds of bank fraud and other offenses based on a letter
indicating that the defendant did not intend to defraud the bank. Id. at 482.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 487.
Id.
Id. at 488.
145 U.S. 285 (1892).
Id. at 285.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 287-88.
Id.
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United States Supreme Court held that the letters should have
been admitted. As statements of plan or intent they could be used
to demonstrate that Walters acted in accordance with his declared
intent. 2 1 The Supreme Court stated:
[W]hile he is still alive, his own memory of his state of mind at a
former time is no more likely to be clear and true than a
bystander's recollection of what he then said, and is less
trustworthy than letters written by him at the very time and under
circumstances precluding a suspicion of misrepresentation. 22
According to Federal Rule 803(3), statements of intent which
are introduced to show that a declarant had taken a certain action
are admissible to prove that the intention was carried out by the
declarant. 23 The Advisory Committee's Notes to Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(3) states that "[t]he rule of Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Hillmon ... allowing evidence of intention as tending to
prove the doing of the act intended, is, of course, left
undisturbed." 24 However, the House Judiciary Committee's
Notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) limited the Hillmon
doctrine to only those statements which are directly related to the
intended future conduct of the declarant and not the conduct of a
25
third party.
In United States v. Pheaster,26 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined the Hilimon doctrine with
respect to the contrasting interpretations of the Advisory
Committee's Notes and the House Judiciary Committee's Notes.
In Pheaster, the Ninth Circuit upheld the admissibility of a

21. Id. at 299.
22. Id. at 295. "Wherever the bodily or mental feelings of an individual

are material to be proved, the usual expressions of such feelings are original
and competent evidence. Those expressions are the natural reflexes of what it
might be impossible to show by other testimony." Id. at 296. (quoting
Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 75 U.S. 397, 404 (1869)).
23. See FED. R. EviD. 803(3).
24. See FED. R. EviD. 803(3) advisory committee's note (emphasis
added).
25. See FED. R. EvID. 803(3) House Committee Judiciary Report.
26. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976)
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statement that was made by a teenage victim to his friends. 27 The
victim stated his intention to meet a man named "Angelo" in the
parking lot, in order to obtain a pound of free marijuana. 2 8 The
statement was introduced as evidence to show that the victim
actually met "Angelo," the alleged kidnapper. 2 9
The Pheaster court rejected defendant's arguments that the
statements should have been admitted only to show the victim's
state of mind, rather than the actions of the defendant. 30 The
court noted that the House Judiciary Committee's Note states that
"the Committee intends that the Rule be construed to limit the
[Hillmon] doctrine... so as to render statements of intent by a
declarant admissible only to prove his future conduct, not the
future conduct of another person." 3 1 However, the court "read
the note of the Advisory Committee as presuming that the
Hilimon doctrine would be incorporated in full force ... ."32
In United States v. Cicale,33 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit explained that statements of an
intention to engage in an action can be used to demonstrate the
actions of a third party. 34 Although the Cicale court did not have
to address the Hilimon controversy, the court, in footnotes and
dicta, noted its willingness to draw an inference from the
declarant's statements to the action of another person. 35 The
27. Id. at 380.
28. Id. at 375.
29. Id.
30. Id.

31. Id. at 379.
32. Id.

33. 691 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1982).
34. Id. at 104.

35. Id. at 103-04. The Cicale court stated:
On several other occasions we have recognized that Hillhnon allows the
implication to be drawn from a declarant's statement that he had
"relations" with the other persons implicated which made his criminal
plan "feasible," thereby rendering such statements admissible "to show
the existence of a conspiracy" from which a third party's participation
may be inferred.
Id. at 104.
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court stated that a declarant's statements indicating the intent to
"carry out a plan," are admissible pursuant to 803(3) and "the
Hillmon issue does not arise" if the participation of a third party
36
can be proven by independent means.
New York follows the common law rule, which was derived
from Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon. 37 In New York,
statements of intention to prove a subsequent act are admissible.
For instance, in In re Newcomb, 38 the court of appeals held that
written statements indicating Newcomb's plans to move her
domicile were relevant to her existing intent. 39 Since Newcomb's
intention was a material fact to be proved, the court allowed
40
admission of her written declarations as evidence of her intent.
The court explained that Newcomb's good faith, as well as the
41
weight of the statements, established her intention.
Moreover, in People v. Conklin,42 the court held that
declarations which tended to show an intent to commit suicide,
which were made three years prior to the death, should have been
admissible at trial. 4 3 The court explained that "this testimony,
although quite remote, was admissible on an issue of fact
involving the question of whether the deceased took her own life
or her death was caused by the act of the defendant. ", 44 Thus, the
court's holding demonstrates that the question of remoteness is
for the trial court to determine.
36. Id.

37. 145 U.S. 285 (1892). "The existence of a particular intention in a
certain person at a certain time being a material fact to be proved, evidence
that he expressed that intention at that time is as direct evidence of the fact, as
his own testimony that he then had that intention would be." Id. at 295.
38. 192 N.Y. 238, 84 N.E. 950 (1908). In Newcomb, the issue concerned
domiciliary intent. Newcomb, prior to executing her will, mailed letters to her

friends and associates announcing her intention to make New Orleans her
future permanent domicile. Id. at 240, 84 N.E. at 951.
39. Id. at 252, 84 N.E. at 955 ("Such declarations are not self-serving in
an improper sense, unless they are made with intent to deceive.").
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
175 N.Y. 333, 67 N.E. 624 (1903).
Id. at 343, 67 N.E. at 627.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss2/27

6

et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

1996]

FRE AND NY EVIDENCE
COMPARISON

567

Further, New York common law parallels Federal Rule 803(3)
in the area of admitting declarations of reason, motive or feeling
when relevant to evidencing the declarant's state of mind. In
Shultz v. Third Avenue R.R. Co.,45 the court found that
declarations of hostility by the witness towards the other party to
the action were admissible to show the witness' credibility. 46 In
People v. Dixon,47 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
held that error occurred when the lower court refused to allow
the defendant's girlfriend to testify regarding threats made by the
victim against the defendant. 48 The court concluded that the
lower court erred because it "disallowed that testimony in the
mistaken belief that the victim's threats were admissible only if
communicated to defendant." 4 9 The court explained that the
victim's threats showed the state of mind of the victim. 50
Although the common law rule adopted by the New York
courts has followed the Hillmon doctrine, the New York
interpretation of the hearsay rule differs from Federal Rule
803(3) with regard to a declarant's expression of pain and
suffering. In Roche v. Brooklyn City & Newton R.R. Co.,51 the
court distinguished evidence of declarations of pain and suffering
made to a physician from such declarations simply stated to a
third party witness, but not made to the third party for purposes
of gaining professional medical attention. 52 The court held that a
declaration of pain and suffering to a third party witness was not
45. 89 N.Y. 242 (1882).
46. Id. at 248-49. See also Loetsch v. New York City Omnibus Corp.,
291 N.Y. 308, 310-11, 52 N.E.2d 448, 448-49 (1943) (finding admissible

statements in decedent's will showing certain emotional feelings between
decedent and her husband were admissible as relevant to understanding their
relationship).
47. 138 A.D.2d 929, 526 N.Y.S.2d 269 (4th Dep't 1988).
48. Id. at 930, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 105 N.Y. 294, 11 N.E. 630 (1887) Here, a third party witness offered
evidence of the plaintiff's complaints of pain long after the happening of the
accident. Id. at 296, 11 N.E.2d at 630-31.
52. Id. at 298, 11 N.E. at 632.
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53
admissible unless made for purposes of obtaining treatment.
The court also concluded that involuntary expressions such as
moans and screams were more trustworthy than ordinary
statements of pain, since they were truly narrative of the present
condition. 54 Further, in Davidson v. Cornell,55 the New York
Court of Appeals held that declarations of present, not past, pain
and suffering are admissible only when made to a physician for
56
the purpose of obtaining treatment.
In sum, Federal Rule 803(3) and the New York courts have
held that relevant declarations of reason, motive or feeling are
admissible when evidencing the declarant's existing intent or his
existing state of mind. It is in this respect that New York most
closely adheres to Federal Rule 803(3). However, New York's
rule is distinguishable from Federal Rule 803(3) regarding
declarations of pain and suffering of present physical conditions.
New York limits the admissibility of declarations of pain and
suffering to those made to a physician for purposes of diagnosis

53. Id. at 299, 11 N.E. at 632.
54. Id. at 298, 11 N.E. at 631. "Evidence of exclamations, groans and
screams is now permitted more upon the ground that it is a better and clearer
and more vigorous description of the then existing physical condition of the
party by an eye-witness than could be given in any other way." Id. See also
Hagenlocher v. Coney Island & B.R. Co., 99 N.Y. 136, 136 N.E. 1 (1885).
55. 132 N.Y. 228, 30 N.E. 573 (1892).
56. Id. at 237, 30 N.E. at 576. The court of appeals noted that the hearsay
exception does not apply when made to a physician who has examined the
patient, not for treatment, but only to prepare for testimony as an expert for
trial. Id.
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or treatment. In contrast, Federal Rule 803(3) does not require
the statement to be made to a physician.
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